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Despite deemphasis of Sino-Soviet friendship and the debt to Russia, new steps toward Russification are noted. For instance, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association takes over the task of promoting the Russian language, study of Soviet documents is accelerated, with cadres warned to consider Malenkov's principles "as State law"; and efforts to tighten the Pa.ty grip and centralize Governmental control continue.

Imminence of a new Resist-America, Aid-Korea drive still is apparent, but whether as another money-raising campaign or in some new form is not certain. Preferential treatment receives new stress, and efforts are made to whip up enthusiasm for the Army, partly through convincing the people of Army "solicitude" for their welfare. War propagands continues to stress American aggression as well as American weaknesses that guarantee a Communist victory. However, special praise for the Korean People's Army and advice to the Chinese to "master the military techniques and combat experience of the KPA to strengthen the unity of Chinese and Korean units" might indicate weaknesses in the Communist ranks and new subservience to the KPA's Russian teachers.

There is ample evidence of difficulties linked with the basic construction campaign. New priorities consign coke to "industrial rather than civilian use." but as practically all coke in China is used by industry already, this probably means private concerns will be denied supplies altogether, thus limiting consumer goods production. Government personnel apparently still refuse wholehearted support to the basic construction program, while resistance from old workers is admitted, though the Tully indoctrinated new workers are credited with whipping them into line. New emphasis on training and indoctrination of mulitiamen, continued stress on tender treatment for Party informers, and punishment for teachers, all suggest that fear of active resistance to the regime still is great.

Weaknesses of the top-heavy bureaucracy being built are illustrated by complaints that propaganda activities of production models keep them from producing, and by admission that the exaggerated zeal of loyal caures in some localities arouses only amused contempt among the peasants.

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